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Abstract 
,\ lode m 111111111111111 mtge syst<'IIIS lwl'f: operotl!d jhr more than u cl!ntw:\'. Some Pac{/ic countries 1rere among the 
pioneas in I!Stohlishing minimum 1mges. This paper d iscusses the mwl.\' aims tha t minimus wages are designed to 
uchie1·c. These include promoting socia l j ustice. olll! l'iuting po 1·erty. promoting economic development. selting 
lwndunarksj(Jr other 1mges u11d social security po.\'11U!nts. and controlling il?flation. The Asia Pac{/ ic region has on~v a 
sllwll1111111hl!r (?f'countril!s 11 ·ith ude!quoh! minimum ,,·age s.1·srems. Thf're ore mw1y d(~jiciencies in the 1•arious systems. 
Tile!.\ ' l?/icn do not cm·er u/1 ,,·orkers. are! (?lien set ut 1111reu/istical~\' lo11· fe, ·els. or are et?/'orced inadequate~\'. The paper 
discuss/!.\ the cuust!s o(the.H' d(~/iciencit!s and the conS!!CJIIC!IIces of'rlu.!ln(vr those 11 ·ho re~1· on minimum 1rages. 
Introduction 
Minimum w:1ge laws arc a common fea ture of industrial 
'-
rela tions systems in many coun tries. The main ILO 
convention on min imum wages. I LO Convention 26. has 
-
one or the highest ratif~cations by national governments. 
\\'h•'n this com cntion \\'as adopted in 1928. the I LO · s 
conccm was to pro,·ide ·fair \\'ages· and ensure that 
global trade was not based on cheap labour. These arc 
still key reasons for being wnccrncd with main taining 
. - -
adequate minimum wnge :;ystcms. but other concerns 
have been addressed through minimum wage m~lc h in c ry 
too. These aims sometimes come in to contlict with one 
another. \\·hich puts min imum wage systems in most 
countries under strain. 
or the many differences between dc\·cloping and 
:.~d, ·anccd countries. fc,v arc as spectacular as the 
differences in ""ages. Labour compensation costs in New 
Zea land arc onl y a quarter of those in the US (US 
Department of Labor. 2002 ). The wages of a f~1c to ry 
wmkcr in Shcnzhen is only half that of a ,,·orkcr in 
Bangkok ( Bcnde-Nabende. 1997). H iddcn behind these 
-diffi:rcnccs arc further ditTercnccs in producti,·ity 
bct\\'ccn enterprises. and di fTcrcnccs in wages between 
categories of \\'Orkcr \\'ithin enterprises. The minimum 
,,. al.!·~ . l.!. lobalization and loca l labour markets interact 
- -di ffcrcntly in the deve loping coun tries and the advanced 
countries. This paper examines some of these issues 
within the contex t of the As ia Pac ific reQion. The main 
~ 
section:; of the paper dea l in turn \\'i th the history of 
minimum wage systcrns. the po:;ition of minimum wage 
systems within intemational la\\'. the different objectives 
lt)adcd onto minimum wage systems. the di fferent forms 
or minimum \\'age system in practice. and a brief 
overview of minimum wages in the Asia Pac ific region. 
The longest sec tion of the paper addresses the problems 
of implementing effecti ve systems: the tssues of 
coverage. leve l. compliance, and the ro le of the social 
actors. particularl y govemment. 
!liston· 
Modem laws providing for systems of minimum wages 
were fi rst enacted in New Zealand in 1894 when the 
Industria l Conci liation and Arbitration Act provided for 
the system or industri al and occupational awards that set 
min imum rates of pay and bound all employers in the 
relevant industries. 
Other Pacific-rim countries were pioneers in mmtmum 
\\'age fixing too. The state of Massachusetts introduced a 
statutory mmtmum in 1912. A federal minimum wage 
was introduced in the USA in 1938. although coverage 
was limited initiall y. European countries introduced 
min imum wage legislation in the fi rst decades of the 
t\vcnticth century. mainly to protec t homeworkers (Starr. 
1981 ). These experiments. in common with the systems 
established in New Zealand and Australia. guaranteed 
minimum waees for the workers covered. but fell short of 
-being national systems of minimum wages. Minimum 
wage laws with broad coverage were implemented much 
later. For example. New Zealand did not introduce a 
national mini trtum wage unti l 1945. 51 years after it had 
introduced industrial and occupational minima. Australia 
still has an incomplete coverage. There is no federal 
un iversal minimum wage. but all the states except NSW 
and Tasmania legislated in the last decade or so to 
provide state-wide guaranteed minimums. 
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Today about 180 countries have some fonn of minimum 
wage. A minimum wage tends to be a correlate of 
economic development. Minimum wage systems are less 
common in very small countries such as the micro states 
of Oceania and in less developed regions. Minimum 
wage legislation is most common in Africa where 48 out 
of the 57 countries have a minimum wage. Europe also 
has a large proportion of countries with minimum wages, 
but countries such as Italy, Gennany and Norway have no 
statutory minima. Instead these countries have extensive 
collective bargaining and a system whereby collective 
agreements are automatically extended to other finns in 
the same sector, thus most workers have a guaranteed 
legal minimum despite their being no general mmtmum 
system in place. 
Minimum Wages and International Law 
The obligation on governments to provide for a system of 
minimum wages is rooted in international law. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ( 1948) asserts 
'the right to just and favourable remuneration' (Article 
32(2)) as does the UN 's International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights ( 1966) (Artic le 7). 
The Declaration of Philadelphia ( 1944) which redefined 
the aim and purpose of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) identified the guarantee of adequate 
wages as a task of government. 
ILO Conventions 26 ( 1928), 99 ( 195 1) and 131 ( 1970) 
relate to minimum wages. Convention 26 obliges 
governments to create minimum wage tixing mach inery 
where ' no arrangements exist for the effective regulation 
of wages ... and wages are exceptionally low' {Article I. 
para 1 ). Convention 99 covers minimum wages in 
agriculture. Convention 131 is focusscd on the ·needs of 
developing countries'. While the Conventions do not 
specify the level at which minimum wages should be set, 
Recommendation 30, which is intended to be a guide to 
Convention 26, states that minimum wages should be set 
accord ing to ' the general level of wages in the country' 
(Section Ill ). Convention 13 I states that the level of the 
minimum wages should be ·appropriate in relation to 
national practice' and include '(a) the needs of workers 
and their famil ies, taking into account the general level of 
wages in the country, the cost of living. social security 
benefits, and the relative living standards of other social 
groups; (b) economic factors. including the requirements 
of economic development, levels of productivi ty and the 
desirability of attaining and maintaining a high level of 
employment' (Article 3). 
Minimum Wage Systems in Operation 
ILO Convention 26 was adopted only nine years after the 
ILO had been founded. The aim of the convention was 
twofold: one the one hand, to provide wages that were 
fair to the worker and which reduced the risk of poverty, 
and on the other hand, to make international trade fai r by 
preventing economic dumping whereby a country used 
low wages to gain a cost advantage in trade. Today 
minimum wages play many and different roles tn 
di fferent countries. These different roles, outlined below, 
frequently confl ict, and this constitutes one of the critical 
weaknesses of minimum wage systems. 
Combating Poverty 
lt is axiomatic that a higher minimum wage wi ll mean 
less poverty. Despite the unsurprising finding that that 
low pay is less common where there are minimum wage 
laws (loakimoglou and Soumeli. 2002) some argue that a 
minimum wage does li ttle to relieve poverty since many 
of the poor are not in regular employment (e.g. Johnston 
and Stark, 1991 ; Standing. 1999), or that some of the 
lower paid belong to well-off households. This latter 
observation, however. is not a reason to permit low pay. 
lt is a consequence of low pay. One of the main reasons 
the US minimum wage is relatively ineffective in 
reducing poverty is just that it is set so low (Pollin and 
Luce, 1998). 
1t is true of course that a decent minimum wage is not the 
only way to alleviate poverty. The effectiveness of a 
minimum wage in alleviating poverty wi ll depend on the 
tax system and the availabi li ty of additional social 
security benefits. This impl ies that a minimum wage is 
more important in developing countries where low 
income families are less likely to have additional sources 
of income such as social security payments (Lustig and 
McLeod. 1997). Moreover, given the distribution of 
income. more workers are likely to benefit from an 
increase in the minimum wage in developing countries 
than in developed countries (Saget. 200 I). 
Promoting Justice 
Low pay is a consequence of the way that labour markets 
are structured. Some jobs are socially constructed as 
desen' ing relati ve ly low pay. At the same time. some 
categories of workers arc less preferred by employers, or 
are in ci rcumstances which prevent them applying for the 
better jobs. Thus, the preferred categories of worker get 
the better-paid jobs while the others have to compete for 
the jobs that arc left - the poorer-paid jobs. Consequently 
·workers with ... equal skills and abilities arc available at 
widely different prices' (W ilkinson. 1984: 422). The 
categories of worker who are less preferred tend to be 
women. rac ial or religious minorities. people with less 
education (even if education is irrelevant for the tasks to 
be performed) and other ·socially disadvantaged' groups. 
Foreign workers arc particularly vulnerable; they are 
often driven to migrate on account of the low pay and 
high unemployment in thei r home country and are 
prepared to ·work cheap' in their new location. 
These arrangements arc clearly unjust in that many 
workers have to accept low wages. But it is also unjust in 
that the better paid within the same labour market benefit 
from the cheap labour of the low-paid. They benefi t from 
cheaper services where they employ the low-paid 
directly. They also benefit if products or services they 
buy are ·subsidized' by low pay. Workers and other 
consumers in the advanced countries benefi t too from the 
low pay of workers in the developing countries whose 
wages are much lower than theirs and whose products are 
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priced correspondingly lower. Thus minimum wages arc 
essential to reducing inequities within and between 
countries. 
It has been suggested ( Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1989) that 
groups that arc most likely to be low-paid will be the 
principal beneficiaries from the introduction of a 
minimum wage or any increase in an established 
minimum. Thus improving minimum wages would assist 
in attaining equal pay for work of equal value. Each time 
the minimum wage is increased it changes the income of 
a substantial proportion of women. Thus a realistic 
minimum wage should be an integral part of any 
campaign for equal pay. 
SrimulatinQ the! £conomr 
.... . 
The advantages of a minimum wage system to the 
economy have been posited for at least a century (e.g. 
Wcbb and Wcbb. 1920). Wilkinson ( 1984) has argued 
~ 
that a realistic minimum wage alters the tem1s of trade 
~ 
between di ffcrent productive systems. making it more 
difficult for disad,·antagcd tirms to rely on disadvantaged 
labour. thus forcing tim1s to become more efficient by 
im·c~ting in better equipment. better methods and in the 
training of their workforces (Cahuc and Michel. 1996). 
At the international lc,·cl. countries ,,·ith higher minimum 
~ 
wages ,,·ill ha,·c fewer incfticicnt tinns and therefore be 
~ 
able to compete. 
The other bcnctit tS that the higher mtntmum boosts 
~ 
consumption spending. Workers on the minimum wage 
arc likely to spend all of the ir wage ( Borooah and Sharpc. 
1986). and spend more of it on domestically produced 
products ( Borooah. 1988 ). Thus an increase in the 
minimum \\':l!.!e would add more to domestic demand than 
.... 
an increase in pay at other points in th( income 
distribution (sec Brosnan 2002 for more detail). This 
strategy was followed by the Mexican go' ernment in the 
period before 1976 but. as we shall sec below. the 
approach fell foul of other policy objccti\'CS (Grimshaw 
and M ioao. 2002 ). 
The role or thc minimum wage role in providing an 
~ ~ 
income that is both fair and sufficient to combat poverty 
lends to it beinu used a~ a numerairc for social we lfare 
-payments. Thus in some countries. again Mexico being 
an example. the min imum wage is used as basis for 
setting pensions. It is also used to set unemployment 
bcnclits and dismissa l compensation (Grimshaw and 
M iOLLO, 2002 ). 
Gil'illl!. u Leud to Orha lt'uves 
. . .... 
Our obserYation abo,·c that minimum wages arc intended 
-
to pro\ idc a l~tir ''age leads to employers using them as a 
benchmark for lair remuneration. The USA ·s minimum 
\\age bL·ing increased so rarely. it pro,·ides an opportunity 
to sec hO\\ other wages arc afkctcd by an incrense in the 
minimum. In that country u ri se in the minimum wage is 
followed hy further ri ses in wage rates above the tninima 
as cmrloycrs reinterpret what they consider a fair wage. 
Maloney and Nunez (2002) report on an even stronger 
case of this in Latin America - what they term the 
'numeraire' effect. They note that in some Latin 
American countries some well-paid workers receive an 
exact number of minimum wages as their salary. They 
further note that the effect of an increase in the official 
minimum wage translates into wage increases at higher 
levels, in Latin America - at levels up to four times the 
mmunum wage. This is considerably higher than the 
USA where the effect dies off more quickly. 
Controlling Wages and Reducing Inflation etc 
Grimshaw and Miozzo (2002) observe that direct state 
control of wage fi xing has been a conspicuous policy in 
Latin America. Collective bargaining itse lf has been 
controlled and the growth in the minimum wage has been 
held back in an attempt to stabilize wages and prices. As 
a consequence. most Latin American countries 
experienced a decline in the real minimum wage over the 
1980s and 1990s (Grimshaw and Miozzo, 2002). Their 
data indicate that of the eight Latin American countries 
that border the Pacific. only three - Chile, Ecuador and 
Panama - increased their real minimum wage during the 
period 1990-1995. 
Forms of Minimum Wage Laws 
A tota l of I 04 countries have ratified ILO Convention 26. 
However. the convention allows for a wide variety of 
prnctices and few countries have a minimum wage system 
that applies to every worker. The various arrangements 
can be grouped into eight categories: 
(a) a statutory national minimum wage with full 
application (e.g. New Zealand). 
(b) a system of statutory regional minimum wages with 
full application within each region (e.g. Canada, 
Thailand). 
(c) a statutory national minimum wage with exemption 
for certain industries or workers (e.g. South Korea. 
USA). 
(d) a system of statutory regional minimum wages with 
exemption for certain industries or workers (e.g. 
Japan). 
(c) a national minimum wage negotiated through 
co llect ive bargaining but with full. or near full, 
coverage (e.g. Greece, Belgium, Finland). 
(f) selective intervention with orders that provide for 
specitic legal minima in certain industries or 
occupations (e.g. Australia). 
(g) reliance on collective bargaining but with extensions 
of collecti ve agreements to other workers (e.g. 
Germany and Italy). 
(h) combination~ of (a) to (g): e.g. a statutory minimum 
\\'agc with full application which acts as a floor. but 
additional hil!hcr minima in certain industries or 
'-
occupations (e.g. Mexico). or a national minimum 
\\'ith a higher minima in some regions (e.g. USA). 
( i) no official wage but a strong tradition which 
establishes a going rate (e.g. Kiribati) 
Some countries also provide higher minima accord ing to 
a workcr's experience or qualifications. A substantial 
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number of countries have lower rates for young workers 
(e.g. Papua-New Guinea, New Zealand, USA), although 
these rates have become less common in recent years 
(OECD Employment outlook 1998). 
Minimum Wages in the Asia Pacific Region 
Table l sets out mean hourly minimum wage rates for the 
Asia Pacific region and the rest of the world, converted to 
New Zealand dollars at the average exchange rates for the 
12 months up to the end of October 2006. The averages 
in Table I are computed only for those countries that 
have a positive minimum wage rate. The average for Asia 
Pacific, at NZ$2.3 1, is only half the world average of 
NZ$2.64. These average data, however, hide wide 
variations within them. Oceania has a higher average of 
NZ$4.51 , Asia's average is NZ$1.10. while in the Latin 
America countries that border the Paci fie, the average is 
only NZ$1. 14. These regional averages also hide 
variation. If we were to exclude Japan. the Asian average 
would fa ll to NZ$0.84, not much more than Latin 
America 's. The table includes data for Europe, and we 
can see the substantial di fferenee between Asia Paci fie 
and Europe: NZ$2.31 compared to NZ$1 0. 78. If we 
exclude the ' rich' countries of Asia Pacific - Canada, 
USA, Japan, New Zealand and Australia - the remainder 
of Asia Pac ific has an average minimum wage of 
NZ$ 1.59. 
Table 1: Average Minimum Wage( a) by Region. 
Region 
Mean Asia Paci fie 
Mean rest of world 
Mean world 
Mean Western Europe 
Rest of world without Europe 
Asia Pacific without Canada, USA, 
Japan, New Zealand, Australia 
Minimum 
Hourly Wage 
Rate (NZ$) 
2.31 
2.81 
2.64 
I 0. 78 
1.67 
1.59 
Source: Database held by authors. Details and primary soun:cs 
available on request. 
Notes: (a) Data current at I November 2006 . . 
We noted that these data arc only for countries that have a pos111w 
minimum wage. Bearing in mind that Asia has a lower ~roportion of 
countries with a minimum wage. if we include the countnes without a 
minimum in the average. the mean for all Asian . countries red~ccs to 
US$0.88. less than two-thirds the correspondmg average tor all 
countries. which stands at US$1.35 and less than the average for the 
Middle East - the region where minimum wages are least common -
whose mean is US$1.41 . 
Problems in Implementing Minimum Wage 
Systems 
There are many problems in managing a minimum wage 
system. To be effective the minimum wage must cover 
all the labour force, it must be adjusted to a level that 
ensures that no one is low-paid, and it must be enforced. 
While these requirements pose problems in their 
implementation, there are additional features that 
undermine the system: the pressures produced by 
globalization, lukewarm support from the social .actors, 
and the conflicting objectives which governments tmpose 
on minimum wage systems. 
Coverage 
Minimum wage systems can only be effective if they 
cover the workers who are likely to be low-paid. Illegal 
workers usually lie outside the protection of the law. 
Thus if they are not entitled to work. they are not entitled 
to the minimum wage. 
The arrangements vary substantially across nations. In 
some countries the minimum wage only applies to the 
private sector. Small firms may be excluded from 
coverage. Some countries have different rates for blue-
and white-collar workers, some different rates for 
qualified and unqualified workers. Some countries. have 
an experience requirement or different rates for tramees. 
Some countries exclude particular categories of worker 
or grant them a lower rate. Some countries e~clude 
young workers. Regional variations within countnes are 
not uncommon: Mexico, Canada and Japan have different 
minimum wages for different regions. Australia 
constitutes an unusual example within the Asia Pacific 
region: indeed within the world. in that four of the six 
states have statutory minimum wages while the federal 
territories, Tasmania and the largest state. New South 
Wales, have no minimum: instead workers in those 
regions have to rely on the ex tensive, but nonetheless 
piecemeal. system of awards. 
In thr developing countries of Asia, the group that most 
needs a guaranteed minimum wage is persons employed 
in the informal sector. Conditions in the infonnal sector 
are difficult to police. Furthermore. informal sector 
workers may work outside established legal frameworks 
and may not be entitled to statutory minima. While the 
infonnal sector in the advanced countries employs 
between 2 and 15% of the labour force (Standing.l999 
p. ll 2), the ILO ( 1997) estimated the share in developing 
countries at between 30% and 80% of the labour force. It 
further estimated that the informal sector employs 61% of 
the urban labour force in Africa and will have generated 
93% of new jobs in the 1990~ . The proportion is lower in 
Asia, at around 40-50%. but ranges from I 0% in the most 
developed countries of Asia to comparable fi gures to 
Africa in India and Bangladesh (ILO. 1997). 
Most countries that have a minimum wage have it set at 
levels that are inadequate for meeting basic consumption 
needs. Of the 178 countries that have some form of 
minimum wage, only 52 have a minimum which is 
greater than NZ$2 .00 an hour. Some 89 have a min imum 
of less than NZ$ 1.00 an hour. 
Although the ILO has adopted three conventions on 
minimum wages, they offer little guide as to what is a 
reasonable level. The associated Recommendations do 
make reference to living standards, prevailing wages etc . 
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but the wording is deliberately vague. The intent ion is 
that minimum wages must meet the cost of living but it is 
often the case that the minimum wage comes nowhere 
close to that objecti ve. As an example, the minimum 
wage in Nicaragua meets only one third of the cost of 
living (Tabb. 2002). 
A crucial issue is whether or not the mm1mum wage is 
adjusted regularly. There are many different ways that 
governments adjust thei r minima: 
(a) legislation or decision of the Executive (e.g. Canada. 
New Zealand. USA). 
(b) government on the 
independent review 
Korea). 
recommendation of an 
body (e.g. Japan. South 
(c) independent authority (e.g. Australia, Mexico). 
(d) indexation to the CPI (e.g. France). 
(c) indexation to average wages (e.g. Netherlands). 
(f) other formulae (e.g. Poland). 
The minimum wage is unstab le in many of the developing 
Asia-Pacific countries because of the irregularity of the 
rev iew process or the contlation of the needs of the 
working poor with other considerations. Some countries 
in the reuion have regular review processes in place. e.g. 
t::::' - '-
Costa Rica and Colombia. although the effec ts on 
employment and on ·competitiveness arc often 
considerations. Consequently. the va lue of the minimum 
wage can fall easi ly into the range where it fails to meet 
basic consumption needs. Saget (200 I) reports that 
minimum wages in Latin American countries lost 30'~ o of 
'-
their \':.lluc between 1 9~0 and 1990. 
The instability of m1n1mum wages in Latin America 
result from policy sec-saws whereby the minimum wage 
is adjusted upwards at one time to combat poverty. and 
held ·back at others to attempt to control intlation. This is 
particularly noticeable in Mexico vvhereby the min imum 
wage was used as an instrument to redistribute income 
and st imulate demand before 1976. but used as a tool to 
tight intlation in the period that has followed (Grimshaw 
and Miozzo. 2002). The Mexican minimum wage 
decreased -l5n u during the 1 9~0s. On the other hand. it 
increased in Colombia by about the same percentage 
(Saget. 200 I). 
Minimum wages fell in some Asian countries too. The 
Phil ippines experienced a continuous decline in the real 
va lue of minimum wages in the 19X0s and into the 1990s. 
.... 
On the other hand. Thailand increased its minimum in 
real terms from the 1980s in to the 1990s (Sag et. 200 I). 
The more advanced countries of the region with more 
.... 
stable economics suffer declines too. especially when 
conservati ve govcmn1ents choose not to adjust the 
.... 
minimum. The US minimum wage buys no more than 
t\vo-thirds what it did in 196X. and it was not adjusted at 
all between January 19X I and April 1990. Lee ( 1999) 
attributed most or the growth in inequality that occurred 
in the United Sates during the 19XOs to the decline in the 
real value of the minimum wage during the Reagan years. 
Similarly in New Zealand, National Party governments' 
neglect of the minimum wage allowed it to decline by 
almost a half between 1954 and 1984 (Brosnan and 
Wilkinson, 1989). 
C ompliance!Et?forcemenr 
No matter how high the minimum wage rate is, nor how 
extensive its coverage, it will be ineffective if employers 
offer wages less than the minimum. Compliance is a 
serious problem in all countries. Possibly no country has 
a large enough inspectorate to enforce the minimum 
wage, and many countries have no inspectorate at all , 
relying on complaints from workers or trade unions. The 
problem of enforcement is compounded where unionism 
is banned or severely curtailed. The pressures of 
globalization. which we highlight below, are another 
factor that weakens unionism and potentially reduces the 
degree of compliance. 
There arc regimes that are unwilling, or incapable of 
enforc ing workers· rights, whatever the law may say. 
Many countries seem to have a minimum wage which is 
mere window dressing: they are unable to provide 
infonnation about the minimum wage - the proportion of 
workers covered. the degree of compliance. or its impact 
on particular population sub-groups such as youth, 
women etc. 
Even in Colombia, which stands out as a Latin American 
country where the real minimum wage has increased in 
recent decades. 25°Al of workers are paid less than the 
minimum (Maloney and Nui'iez, 2002). The reason for 
this is that ·a high share of new jobs in the developing 
world arc nowadays created in the informal sector where 
the minimum wage is weakly ... enforced' (Saget, 2001, 
p.l ). Studies indicate high levels of non-compliance in 
many Asia Paci fie countries: 54% in Guatemala, 9% in 
Chile. and 15% in Indonesia, with low levels of 
compliance in the Philippines which has no penalties for 
underpayment. Non-compliance is a particular problem 
in small fim1s. A Latin American study quoted by Saget 
( 200 I) reports that 63'Yo of workers in 'micro-enterprises' 
in Costa Rica were paid below the minimum wage. The 
corresponding percentages were 46% in Panama. 28% in 
Chile and. 19% in Mexico and 16% in Colombia. 
There is a relationship between the level of the minimum 
wage and degree of compliance in that a lower minimum 
wage makes compliance more likely (Lustig and 
McLeod. 1997). For that reason, it may be politic to 
introduce minimum wages initially at lower levels then 
gradually increase them to more realistic leve ls so that the 
concept becomes accepted and then compliance becomes 
more likely when a realistic level is attained. 
Lack o(Supporr.fi"om rhl! Social Acrors 
The preceding sections give us some clues as to how the 
social actors might view minimum wage systems. 
Employers tend to be divided over the issue. Employers 
in labour-intensive workplaces that rely on cheap labour 
for their surviva l and profitability tend to oppose 
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mt~u_num ~~ges in general, and resist any increase in 
ext~tm~ mtnt~a. On the other hand, employers in more 
capttal-mtenstve finns that pay better wages ma I . . y 
we come mmt~um wage systems and, furthennore, see 
them as protectton from competition from less efficient 
finns that rely on cheap labour. 
Trade unions are .o~en supportive of mmtmum wage 
systems. The mtntmum wage provides a floor for 
eolle~t~ve bargaining, and it meets the social objective of 
provtdmg for workers with limited bargaining power and 
who are una?l~ to organize. Thus trade unions generally 
lobby for mmt~u.m wage systems, and argue for higher 
levels of the mmtmum where one has been established. 
However this is not always the case. For example some 
trade unions resist the idea of a standard national 
minimum believing it undennines collecti ve action. 
Whatever the views of employers and unions. the 
government is the key player in effective minimum wage 
systems. Governments, directly or indirectly detennine 
the level of the minimum wage, they detennine whom it 
should cover, and they provide the resources for its 
enforcement. Given the number of ratifications of the 
ILO conventions on minimum wages, it could appear that 
governments in general agree with the concept. 
However, some governments whose countries have 
ratified the conventions. such as Fiji, have no minimum 
wage in place. Many have defective minimum wage 
systems or have even abolished minimum wage systems 
that had been set up. For example, Papua-New Guinea 
introduced minimum wage legislation in 1972, scrapped 
it in 1992, reinstated it but has kept rates low - cun-ently 
37.5 Kina per week (NZ$20). During 200 I. the Papua-
New Guinea Minimum Wage Board recommended a 
large increase, but the government blocked it. and no 
increase was implemented. 
There are several reasons why governments are reluctant 
to establish and maintain effective minimum waoe 0 
systems: fear of inflation, concerns about the fiscal 
impact, and the unease over the possible employment 
effects, the latter often fuelled by international agencies. 
We have argued before that the possibility of general 
inflation following a minimum wage increase is not 
strong (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1988). Inflationary 
effects may be offset by increased productivity (Hughes, 
1976) or a reduction in profits. An important factor will 
be the extent to which higher paid workers successfully 
restore differentials disturbed by the higher minimum 
wage. However labour markets are segmented such that 
better paid workers are unlikely to be making 
comparisons with workers whose pay is so low to be on 
the minimum wage (Brosnan and Wilkinson, 1988). 
Governments are not unaware of the effects of the 
minimum wage on their fiscal position, particularly where 
government employees are on minimum wage rates, or 
where the government employs contractors who pay 
minimum wage rates. A further concern is where social 
security benefits or pensions are linked into minimum 
wages. Concern with similar issues underlay the IMF's 
threat to Russia, that it would block a scheduled loan if 
the minimum wage were increased (Standing, 1999). 
A prevailing unease on the part of governments is the 
relation between the minimum wage and unemployment. 
The argument, derived from simplistic economic theories, 
is that with higher minimum wage rates, fewer workers 
will be hired. (for discussion see Brosnan, 2002). A 
similar claim is made with respect to youth employment -
imposing a minimum wage for youth (or a relatively 
higher one where one exists already) would lead to lower 
employment rates for youth to the benefit of non-youth 
workers. The story is told most strongly in the US, but 
has been critiqued even within the economics 
establishment (Card and Krueger, 1995). Although these 
propositions have been tested in various countries, the 
resu lts are never conclusive. Regression coeffi cients are 
frequently not significant, or the predicted relationships 
are found not to exist. Where there does appear to be a 
relationship, other factors are frequently responsible (see 
Ghellab, 1998). Nonetheless, countries still hold wages 
down in fear of unemployment (see Brosnan 2003 for a 
more detail ). 
Conclusion 
Minimum wage systems are not particularly robust in the 
Asia Pacific region. The proportion of countries with a 
minimum wage is slightly below the world average, and 
the levels of minimum wages tend to be low as well. 
There is considerable diversity within the region, but even 
some of the ·rich' countries that have had a fonn of 
minimum wage for some time have histories of 
neglecting to adjust the mmtmum including, as 
mentioned, in New Zealand. In common with much of 
the world, minimum wages in the region are not well 
enforced. 
There arc particular problems in the region, the large 
infonnal sector in Asia make enforcement difficult, and 
provtde little incentive for governments to legislate or to 
set the minimum wage at a realistic level. Moreover, 
minimum wages have often been deliberately held down 
in an attempt to control inflation. Japan and Australia 
have the highest minimum wages in the region but in 
Australia, coverage has not been universal since almost 
ha If the Australian labour force has had no statutory 
mmtmum wage. 
The lack of effecti ve mmtma impact upon particular 
groups. These include women, racial or religious 
minorities, and migrants. Justice demands that these 
people have access to a decent income. The nation-state 
is the only organization cun-ently capable of regulating 
wages where collective bargaining is poorly developed. 
Unfortunately some national trade union movements arc 
reluctant to push for better minimum wage systems 
because they believe they may undennine collective 
bargaining and trade union organization. Nonetheless, 
governments and trade unions have an interest in there 
being adequate minimum wage systems in the countries 
with whom they trade or compete in trade. 
The challenge for many Asia Pacific nations is to set 
minimum wage at a decent level , to devise ways that it 
can cover the infonnal sector, and to enforce it 
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successfully. In some countries th is may be an awesome 
task for it demands a sophisticated legal system. and must 
overcome the objections of employers who fear their 
ability to compete would be undermined. A sound 
minimum wage system can be a spur to a more efficient 
economy. one that does not rely on cheap labour for its 
success. A better minimum wage is not a full solution to 
the problems of poverty. inequal ity or uneven economic 
development - a successful policy on minimum wages 
must be nested in broader polic ies of labour regulation 
and economic development - nonetheless a sound 
minimum wage system must be an essential component 
of any package of policies to achieve these objecti ves. 
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